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【국문초록】

필자는 법전원은 학생들이 졸업후 법조직에 종사하고 성공하기 위하여 필요한
실무교육에 중점을 두는 것을 사명으로 한다는 칼 르웰린과 같은 과거의 위대한
학자가 주장한 바에 전적으로 동의한다. 그러나 르웰린과 마찬가지로, 필자는 法
學 아닌 一般大學院 교육전통을 혼합하여 학생들의 內的 領域을 확대하고, 이를
법실무교육의 한 부분으로 하는 것이 우리가 학생들에게 부담하고 있는 負債라고
믿고 있다. 그 절적한 균형점을 찾는 것이 중요한 과제의 하나라 할 수 있다. 우
리는 변호사 고용시장의 停滯를 이유로 현재 미국 내에서 제기되고 있는 법전원
및 변호사 수를 감축하자는 논의에 대하여는 동의하지 않는다는 것을 강조하고
싶다. 똑같은 論法이 경제위기 기간에도 나온 바 있다. 한편 이는 유대인과 최근
의 이민자들에 의하여 법률시장이 전반적으로 장악되고 있다는 우려가 암묵적으
로 이러한 주장의 배경이 되고 있다. 그러나 누구도 미국에는 너무 많은 변호
사가 있다고 주장할 수 있는 합리적 근거를 댈 수 없다. 현재 형사변호사들은
매일 검사로부터 유죄인부협상을 하도록 강요되고 있는데, 이는 많은 공익변호사
들이 합리적으로 사건관리를 할 수 없을 정도로 사건과중으로 압박받고 있기 때
문이다. 임차인들은 자신들을 대리할 변호사를 고용할 비용이 없어 거주지에서
쫓겨나고 있는 현실이다. 가정 내 폭력의 피해자들은 자신을 보호할 수 있는 보
호영장을 어떻게 집행할 수 있는지 알 수 없어 보호의 범위 밖에서 신음하고 있
다. 한마디로 사회 빈민층 미국인들을 도와줄 있는 변호사의 수요는 다른 어느
때보다 많은 현실이며, 그러한 빈민층은 변호사를 선임할 자력이 없다. 만약 주정
부가 그러한 빈민층을 위하여 변호사를 선임할 수 있도록 지원하지 않고, 변호사
들이 자발적으로 서비스를 제공한다고 보는 것은 비현실적이다. 이러한 문제는
또 다음 기회에 논의할 수 있는 좋은 주제가 될 것이다.

* Associate Dean and Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., Columbia
Law School; Ph.D., Brandeis University.
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I am grateful for the invitation to present my thoughts before this
distinguished group of academics. I am very pleased to represent Northern
Illinois University College of Law here in South Korea, and honored to play
my part in the informal academic exchange program we have developed with
Chosun University.
I hope that I am worthy of the honor, but fear I cannot do justice to the
important topic you have asked me to address. I say this not out of modesty
but out of candor. Some of our finest legal thinkers have spoken and written
about the state of legal education in the United States. These include
twentieth- century luminaries like the iconoclastic scholars Jerome Frank, Karl
Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore. And recently many academics have asked how
best to educate our students for productive and meaningful careers in the law
during a time of rapid transformation in the legal market. In my remarks, I
will draw heavily from the insights of my predecessors.
As a professor and administrator at a public law school, I have witnessed
firsth and widespread changes in the legal market for our graduates, and I
have observed how that transformation has affected how and what we teach
our students. Some of the disruption in the legal market was undoubtedly
hastened by the Great Recession. But the truth is that law firms had already
turned to computer programs for document review, were increasingly relying
on contract lawyers, and had begun outsourcing legal work to India and the
Philippines well before the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Moreover,
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innovations like Legal Zoom and other do-it-yourself online services had
likewise already gained a foothold before the economic crisis hit.
The shifting landscape of the legal economy may have been hastened by the
past decade's economic turmoil, but change itself was inevitable. And these
changes have forced law schools to consider ways of transforming the delivery
of a legal education. The chain of causation is inescapable. As clients have
found new ways to get legal services, they have exerted downward pressure
on billing, which has created changes in the economics of law practice, which
in turn has meant fewer well-paying law jobs. Add to this new reality
skyrocketing law school tuition and graduate debt loads, fewer law school
applicants, smaller class sizes and less tuition income for law schools, and the
need for some degree of rethinking the modern law school is inevitable.1)
But, as you can imagine, institutions do not transform themselves easily.
Metamorphosis is difficult, even assuming we decide on exactly how it is that
we want to change. That said, you will be hard-pressed to find an American
legal academic who does not recognize that the old way of doing thingsof
asking students to abide three years of casebook study, podium lecturing and
Socratic questioning, with a small dose of experiential learningare no longer, in
and of themselves, adequate to provide a meaningful education for tomorrow's
lawyers.
Before I broach today's challenges and explain what we are doing at
Northern Illinois to meet those challenges, I want to look backwards toward
the origins of modern legal education.

Ⅰ. Langdell and the Origins of Contemporary American
Legal Education
The United States has always needed lawyers, and lawyers have always
1) See Nancy Rappaport, Rethinking U.S. Legal Education: No More Same Old, Same Old,
45 Conn. L. Rev. 1409, 1413-14 (2013).
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needed training. But from the early days of the Republic through much of the
nineteenth century, an aspiring lawyer typically learned his trade not by
attending law school, but rather by reading law which meant apprenticing
himself to a practicing lawyer.2) To be sure, some universities offered a
smattering of law course seven in the early nineteenth century, and by the
middle of the century, a relative handful of universities including Harvard, Yale
and Columbia had established schools of law. But few aspiring lawyers began
their careers by pursuing a formal education, and law itself had tenuous
standing as a discipline worthy of study and teaching in the university.
Lawyering was understood to be a practical skill, and preparing for practice
meantgaining a technical education. The best way to do that was by simply
doing law.
A great shift came about in the 1870s at Harvard Law School, when Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell sought to put the study of law on the same
footing as other academic disciplines in the university. His one great idea (as
Professor Grant Gilmore mockingly described it) was that law was a science.
Law, according to Langdell, was comprised of a small set of finite, consistent
principles that were rooted in nature and natural law. Common law judges, in
drafting their legal opinions over the centuries, had done a better or worse job
of articulating fundamental legal doctrine. It was the role of the scholar to
separate the wheat from the chaff, through a methodical and logical analysis of
those legal opinions to uncover true, unchanging doctrine. Accordingly, for
Langdell, the library is the proper workshop of [law] professors and students
alike; it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists
and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologist, the botanical
2) Professor Stephen R. Alton has explained that in the early nineteenth century a
prospective lawyer in fact had several options open to him. These included choosing
from among a small number of courses offered in the few colleges already formed in
the United States, attending one of the few non-university-affiliated private law
schools, engaging in private self-study of law, clerking in a court clerk's office,
pursuing legal studies in England, or by far the most commonserving an
apprenticeship. Stephen R. Alton, Roll Over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief
History of American Legal Education, 35 Okla. City L. Rev. 339, 342-43 (2010).
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garden to the botanists.3)
It may seem absurd to think of law literally as a branch of natural science,
and it did not take long before the Langdellian approach was critiqued and its
premises undermined. But there can be no dispute that the pedagogic reforms
that Langdell instituted in light of his theory took root and have shaped legal
education to the present day. Among the innovations springing from his
conception of law as science was the casebook method, which had students
read through a selection of edited appellate opinions in order to derive the
legal principles captured in them. For Langdellians, this was the critical skill
that a student

needed

corollaryreform wasthe

in
use

order

to

of the

learn

to

think like

Socratic method

a lawyer.

with

the

A

professor

peppering the law student with a series of increasingly nuanced questions
about rules and doctrine, designed to sharpen his critical thinking skills. Other
Langdellian innovations included assessment by high stakes final examination,
and the formalization of legal education as postgraduate and three years in
length.
Before I discuss the subsequent history and critiques of Langdell's method, I
want to pause to consider its implications. By putting the study of law on
equal footing with other university disciplines, Langdell reconceptualized the
practice of law from a craft to a science. As such, he believed a student
should receive an enhanced liberal education from the university, rather than
vocational training in a set of practical skills. As Langdell himself asserted, If
law be not a science, a university will [best] consult its own dignity in
declining to teach it, for otherwise it is a species of handicraft, and may best
be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices.4) (Many years
later, sociologist Thorstein

Veblen

would suggest that law schools in facthad

no more place in the university than schools of fencing or dancing, since
training for proficiency in some gainful occupation has no connection with the
higher learning.5))
3) Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 Law
123, 124 (1887).
4) Id.

Quarterly

Rev.
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The premises of Langdell's great idea were undermined in short order. First,
with the rise of the social sciences in the American university system in the
latter part of the nineteenth century, it quickly became obsolete to think of law
as a branch of natural science.

With

the establishment of economics, political

science, sociology, and related disciplines, law seemed better characterized as
essentially sociological.6) This reconceptualization was in accord with the
proto-legal realismof Oliver

Wendell

Holmes, Jr., who mocked Langdell's

conception of the common law as an eternal brooding omnipresence in the sk
y,7)instead suggesting that law was just the conventional creation of men
exercising governmental power to bring about their policy preferences.8)
Langdell's ideas also predated passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887
and the creation of the first regulatory agencies in the United States.Langdell's
conception

of

law

as

primarily

all

about

common

anachronistic in light of the rise of the administrative

lawquickly

became

state.9)

Ⅱ. Legal Realism and the Rise of Skills Training
Because few members of the legal academy would today describe themselves
as Thomists that is, adherents to the natural-law philosophy propounded by
Thomas Aquinasit may seem strange that Langdellian pedagogy retains to this
daya tight grip on how law schools educate our students.
teach out of casebooks filled with appellate court opinions?

Why

Why

do we still

do we subject

5) Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of
Universities by Business Men 191, 211 (1954), quoted in David R. Barnhizer, The
Purposes and Methods of American Legal Education, 36 J. Legal Prof. 1, 14 (2011).
6) Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About it, 60
Vand. L. Rev. 609, 636 (2007).
7) Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8) See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457
(1897).
9) Rubin, supra note 7, at 636.
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our students to Socratic questioning in the classroom? And why do weassess
their performance almost exclusively with high stakes final examinations?
The answer to these questions is twofold. First, we still utilize the
Langdellian pedagogy because we think it works, albeit not for the reasons
proposed by Langdell. Second, today we do more than teach out of casebooks,
and have increasingly supplemented our students' legal education with exactly
the kind of skills and practice training that Langdell decried.
I will not spend long defending our continued use of the casebook method
and Socratic questioning, which remain widespread even though there is no
shortage of academics who have attacked them on principleclaiming, for
instance, that we are trapped in a pedagogic fossil.10) Many educators, myself
included, continue to believe in the importance of cultivating traditional lawyer
skills, which have been described by Mari J. Matsuda as including case
analysis and argument from analogy, statutory interpretation, and advocacy
with precision and anticipation of counterarguments.11) All of these skills are
fostered by casebook learning and some form of Socratic dialogue. Likewise,
though the idea of law school as being designed to help students think like a
lawyer is often derided, many academics believe their own law school
experience (casebook instruction included) helped bring rationality and clarity to
their previously muddy habits of thought. There are probably no pure
Langdellians in the academy today, but it seems clear that some form of
casebook and Socratic pedagogy will remain a significant component to
traditional legal education for the foreseeable future.
More interesting has been the question of how best to supplement the
Langdellian-infused pedagogy. By the 1930s and 1940s, some prominent legal
academics had begun to call for radical reform in legal education. Law schools
had become the premier way to train the elite lawyers who would go on to staff
the law firms that had grown to serve America's burgeoning corporations.12) But
10) Id. at 612.
11) Mari J. Matsuda, Admit That the Waters Around You Have Grown: Change and
Legal Education, 89 Indiana L.J. 1381, 1393 (2014); see also Alton, supra note 3, at 351.
12) Alton, supra note 3, at 349.
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legal realists like Jerome Frank believed the abstracted scientific education they
were receiving from poring over appellate decisions was leaving students
unprepared for the messy reality of the practice of law.13) Students lacked
training in practical skills and, at least according to Frank, the cure was to
institute some kind of clinical instruction.14) Another legal realist, Karl
Llewellyn, excoriated the legal training on offer at elite schools like Harvard,
Yale and Columbia, writing that it blinds, it stumbles, it conveyor-belts, it
wastes, it mutilates, and it empties.15)
Llewellyn advocated for a law school curriculum that treated law as both a
practical skill and a liberal art. He thus offered some praise for the German
model of legal education, which had students study law in the classroom for
three years, followed by three years of rotating apprenticeships.16) But he also
wrote,
The truth is

that the best practical training a University can give to any

lawyer who is not by choice or unendowment doomed to be a huckster or
shysterthe best practical training, along with the best human training, is the study
of law, within the professional school itself as a liberal art.17)

Llewellyn's thoughts were very much in line with the progressive educational
vision of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, who advocated for
experiential learning, active learning (for example, involving students in curriculum
13) Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44
Ind. L. Rev. 735, 73839 (2011).
14) Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 Yale L.J. 1303, 1315 (1947); Jerome
Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Penn. L. Rev. 907 (1933).
15) Karl Llewellyn, On What's Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 Colum. L. Rev.
651, 65253 (1935).
16) Id. at 657. Llewellyn nonetheless faulted the tendency of the German system to focus
apprenticeships on judges' chambers. Id.
17) Karl N. Llewellyn, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, inJurisprudence: Realism in
Theory and Practice 375, 376 (1962), quoted in Francis J. Mootz III, Introduction:
Symposium on the State and Future of Legal Education, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 1, 3
(2013).
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design), situated or real-world learning, interdisciplinary learning, and collaborative
learning.18) Interestingly, Dewey was invited by Dean Harlan Fiske Stone to
teach for a year at Columbia Law School, where Llewellyn was a law professor,
in the 1920s. The Columbia Law School experiment in progressive, practiceinfused legal education was a failure, however, in large part because there was
no faculty buy-in for implementing the kinds of reform of the Langdellian
method advocated by Dewey and Llewellyn.19)
In fact, the call for practical training and clinical legal education went largely
unheeded for decades. But in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, clinics established
themselves in American law schools, providing law students with the experience
of representing real clients under the supervision of a practicing lawyer. As a
new century dawned, law schools like mineled by Presidential Teaching Professor
David Taylorbegan developing sophisticated skills training and simulation
courses to help prepare students for the real work of being a lawyer upon
graduation.

Ⅲ. The Present State of Legal Education
In this part, I want to give you a sense of what the typical American law
school looks like today. In the next part I will offer my views of the structural
challenges we face. In the final part of my talk, I will discuss some of the
current proposals for reforming American legal education that are being
debated, and my thoughts about what kind of changes are possible.
What

are American law schools doing today? In large part, we are doing as

Langdell proposed a century and a half ago.

We

offer a heavy diet of doctrinal

courses, many of which are taught in the iconic manner with a professor
engaging in question-and-answer dialogue with students who have prepared
18) John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916).
19) Sara K. Rankin, Tired of Talking: A Call of Clear Strategies for Legal Education
Reform: Moving Beyond the Discussion of Good Ideas to the Real Transformation of
Law Schools, 10 Seattle J. for Soc. Justice 11, 3133 (2011).
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for class by reading a series of judicial appellate opinions. In my opinion, there
are many justifications for not abandoning this approach.
The first is simply that we think the casebook method works. To be more
precise, it does some of the work that we think is necessary in training
lawyers. Stated broadly, the United States is a common-law country, and
judges decide cases not just by reference to statutes and constitutional
provisions, but also by engaging in a dialogue with earlier judicial opinions in
an effort to maintain consistent and rational legal doctrine. Competence in the
skills that casebook training promotes learning how to deconstruct an opinion,
derive its holding, critique its assumptions, analogize its holding to new
situations, and distinguish its holding from others remains one of the key
learning outcomes for law students. In large part, what it means for a student
to think like a lawyer is achieved through this type of instruction.
Second, casebook instruction remains a significant part of the law school
experience because such instruction remains an efficient way to prepare our
students to take and pass the bar examthe licensing exam that stands as the
gatekeeper to a career as a practicing lawyer. Lecture and Socratic courses
allow for efficient information transfer from professors to students. For better
or worse, in order to pass the bar exam, students must be familiar with a
broad range of areas of law. Because students seem increasingly unable to
master the volume of material tested on the bar in private courses during the
six to eight weeks immediately after graduation and before the administration
of the bar exam, law schools increasingly insist that students take more bar
courses to prepare them for the exam.
Third, the case method as practiced in law schools has already evolved
significantly from what Langdell was doing at the end of the nineteenth
century. Casebooks are no longer mere compendia of selected and edited
judicial opinions. Rather, they now feature a variety of other sources, including
not only statutes and constitutional provisions, but also excerpts from
sociological, economic, and philosophical sources. The method has, to be sure,
come unmoored from its theoretical underpinnings. No longer are professor and
student engaged in a search for true doctrine. Rather, the rise of the social
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sciences and the influence of the Legal Realists has led to a casebook method
that interrogates judicial choices and encourages students to critique the law
from the outside.
We

are also doing much more in our law schools today. Although progressive

and practical legal education failed to gain a foothold at Columbia and other
law schools in the first half of the twentieth century, the rise of clinics from
the 1970s on has been steady and profound. Today there are probably no law
schools in the United States that do not offer a robust clinical program, in
which

students

learn

engagement with clients.

the

law

Whether

primarily

through

practical,

real-world

we should be enhancing clinical opportunities,

and how we might do so, is a question I address again briefly in the last part
of my talk.
In addition, we provide students with externship opportunities, encouraging
them to work for lawyers or judges in law offices or judicial chambers in
exchange for course credit rather than money. And we offer simulation courses
and moot court opportunities, which allow students the chance to hone practical
legal skills in a safe setting where mistakes can be tolerated more easily than
in real-world situations where a client's wealth or liberty are on the line.
Finally, law schools are increasingly focusing attention on improving our
students' writing skills,

since they are increasingly arriving unable

to

communicate in a manner adequate for a legal professional.
Doctrinal classes.

Writing

classes. Clinics, externships, and skills classes. At

base, this is what a typical law school curriculum has looked like for the past
decade and longer. This basic structure is unlikely to change, for some of the
reasons already discussed. The key question for us today is whether there is
anything we can do within the boundaries of this structure that will help
better prepare our students for success in the legal marketplace.
The answer is clearly yes. Much can be done. But to determine how to
reform our legal pedagogy, we need to address more forthrightly the nature of
the challenges presently facing American law schools.
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Ⅳ. Some of the Challenges We Face
A first challenge, as I noted earlier, has been the downward pressure on the
legal employment market. Particularly since the Great Recession hit in 2008,
but starting well before then, good-paying jobs for law school graduates have
seen a rapid decline. The tight labor market for lawyers has also come at a
time of strained state budgets, which means that even at public law schools
tuitions have been rising at a startling rate. The rise in tuition costs has
unsurprisingly led to a tremendous increase in the amount of debt with which
law students are graduating. Across the nation, tuition and costs for law
school frequently top

$200,000

for three years, and the average debt for law

graduates (exclusive of the debt incurred for as undergraduates) has been
about

$120,000

in recent years.

All of this means that students are no longer sanguine about their prospects
for gaining meaningful legal employment upon graduation from law school. In
fact, annual applications to law school have fallen nearly 50% nationwide since
2010. The ordinary predictors of success in law school the applicant's undergraduate
grade point average and Law School Admissions Test scoreshave declined
across the applicant pool. This reality has left all but the most elite law
schools in the United States with a Hobson's choice. The law schools could
continue to accept applicants in the same numbers as years past, thereby
keeping tuition income steady but significantly lower the quality of the
incoming class as well as lowering the likelihood that their graduates pass the
bar exam in adequate numbers. Or the law schools could hold the line on
student qualifications, in which case they will surely accept far fewer students
and lose the tuition money necessary to allow the school to function. In fact,
schools have typically adopted some combination of lowered class size and
reduced applicant qualifications. In practice, this means that schools have fewer
financial resources and more responsibilities for providing remedial education
for their matriculants.
A second challenge facing law schools is the changing nature of the legal
marketplace itself. Leave aside for the moment the fact that, at least in the
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short term, there are fewer available legal positions that will support a recent
law school graduate who is saddled with debt. The reality is that the nature
of legal jobs is changing in a variety of ways, and the on-the-job training
that law firms have historically provided for new graduates has largely
disappeared.
I have already briefly noted some of the ways in which the legal market is
changing. For example, software advances now allowcomputer programs to
engage in document review more efficiently and cheaply than junior lawyers.
This technological advance is of course welcomed by law firm clients, and
relieves busy lawyers of some of the tedium that attends a lawyer's job early
in her career. But this technology also makes some lawyer positions redundant.
Likewise, the use of short-term contract attorneys and the outsourcing of
similar tasks to lawyers in other countries, including particularly India, offers
economies to clients but contributes to the pinch in law employment in the
United States.
Different types of technological advances have impacted the legal job market
not just for medium- and large-sized law firms, but also for small-firm and
solo practitioners who could, until the recent past, hope to earn a living by
assisting non-corporate clients do things like draft trusts documents, wills, or
simple contracts. The wealth of free information on the Internet has itself led
potential consumers of law services to forego the hassle and expense of
retaining a lawyer.20) Internet technologies like LegalZoom and Nolo Press offer
a more sophisticated self-help option for individuals in need of legal services.21)
The very idea of the law firm, too, is under assault by Internet technology.
We

have seen the rise of virtual law firms, where associates often have no

physical office.

We

have seen the creation of freemium companies like Rocket

Lawyer, Avvo, and Law Pivot, which offer free legal advice online by
participating lawyers, who then seek to parlay their interactions with advice
seekers into paying work.22)And, more problematic, we have seen a growth in
20) See Jon M. Garon, Legal Education in Disruption: The Headwinds and Tailwinds of
Technology, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (2013).
21) Id. at 1174.
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settlement mills, whose business model relies less on lawyer expertise than on
high volume, low cost, aggressive advertising, and paralegal work.23)
But it is the third challenge that I want to focus on for the remainder of
my talk, because it directly implicates how and what we teach our students,
rather than just impacting the availability of jobs for our law graduates. One
of the important effects of the changing economics of law firms large and
small is that firms are no longer willing or able to provide the kind of
on-the-job training that novice lawyers in the United States have heretofore
routinely received in their first years in practice.

With

the advent of law

schools as the primary institution preparing aspiring lawyers for practice, and
the concomitant decline and eventual disappearance of legal apprenticeships,
novice lawyers required sustained training in their areas of practice upon
taking a new position. To some degree this kind of training was and
remainsinevitable. It is impossible to teach students the nuts and bolts of
every area of law that they could possibly enter. Students graduate to take
positions as criminal prosecutors and defenders, as compliance officers, as
big-firm transactional lawyers, as human rights advocates, as judicial clerks,
and so on. By necessity, legal training must be broad enough to prepare
students for any area of law they might enter.
It is thus unreasonable for the legal community to demand that law schools
produce practice ready lawyers, which is something we often hear even though
we are not sure precisely what it means.24) Is a practice-ready law-school
graduate someone who can draft articles of incorporation, a civil complaint, or
interrogatories without any assistance? Someone who can stand before a
criminal court judge on her first day on the job and argue on behalf of his
client? Someone who can draft a will without any models?
That said, we law school professors and administrators are not oblivious to
22) Id. at 118183.
23) Id. at 1184.
24) See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on the Impact of Current Law School Curriculum on the Future of the
Practice of Law in Illinois 8 (2016) (describing need for practice ready lawyers
without defining what is meant by the phrase).
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the fact that the legal community sees deficits in our students' education. It is
therefore incumbent upon us to constantly reassess the value we are providing
for our students and seek to improve the quality of the educational experience
they receive from us. In the last part of my talk, to which I now turn, I will
discuss some of the proposals that we at Northern Illinois and other academics
are considering as we move deeper into the twenty-first century.

V. The Future(s) of Legal Education
I profess no special insights into how legal education will be transformed in
the future. But I can report to you both the nature of the conversations that
my colleagues and I are engaged in right now, and some of the many
provocative recommendations for modifying pedagogy that have been offered
by academics in recent years.
To begin, I must acknowledge several influential monographs that have
advocated, to various degrees, a restructuring of legal education to deemphasize
the teaching of doctrine and to focus instead on honing law students' practice
skills. In what is known after its principal author as the McCrate Report, the
American Bar Association in 1992 suggested ten fundamental lawyering skills
necessary to develop in students to narrow the gap between law school and
legal practice, including problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal
research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation
and alternative dispute resolution procedures, organization and management of
legal

work,

and

recognizing

and

resolving

ethical

dilemmas.25)These

recommendations engendered discussion but only modest reforms in the law
schools, leading to another report from the Carnegie Foundation in 2007 (not
long after I began teaching full time). The Carnegie Report acknowledged the

25) American Bar Association, Legal Education and Professional DevelopmentAn Educational
Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap, 13840 (1992) [McCrate Report].
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hybrid nature of the law school as institutions for practical training and for
scholarly productivity, but called faculties to task for emphasizing scholarship
over the practical training of students.26) Issued at the same time as the
Carnegie Report was another monograph prepared by clinical law faculty,
usually referred to as the Stuckey Report (after its author), which likewise
decried the lack of meaningful skills training in law schools, offered a host of
suggestions, and further commented on the lack of professionalism that novice
lawyers reportedly displayed in practice.27) These latter two reports in
particular have gotten some traction in the law schools.
Of late academics have been pushing for the broad reforms advocated by the
McCrate, Carnegie, and Stuckey reports, but have focused particular attention
on challenges raised by technology and the shrinking legal employment market.28)
Some of the more interesting ideas include the following:
First, we should rethink the one size fits all law school.29) Legal education
across the United States is remarkably uniform, with law schools drawing
their faculty from the graduates of a stunningly small number of elite law
schools, often with little experience in the actual practice of law. Teaching
loads vary little, and scholarly productivity is universally required of law
professors across the nation. Students too are taught largely in the same
manner, even though the jobs that graduates of the Harvard or Columbia law
schools will likely take are dissimilar to the public service and small firm jobs
that graduates of other law schools will likely accept to begin their practice.
Perhaps some institutions should embrace the role of a teaching or technocratic
26)

William

M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the profession of Law,
45 (2007) [Carnegie Report].
27) Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map, 15
(2007) [Stuckey Report].
28) Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed that in recent years we have been bombarded
with news and scholarly articles about the crisis in legal education. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Crisis in Legal Education or the Other Things Law Students Should
be Learning and Doing, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 133, 133 (2013).
29) See, e.g., Carasik, supra note 14, at 770; American Bar Association Task force on the
Future of Legal Education, Report and Recommendations 23 (2014).
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school, and leave to the professoriate of elite law schools the responsibility for
producing legal scholarship.
Second, we should truly embrace the recommendations of the McCrate,
Carnegie, and Stuckey Reports, and make greater efforts to enhance our
students' experiential learning opportunities, including expanding and mandating
that students participate in a clinic or externship as a prerequisite for
graduating.30) In a contracting job market practical skills are more necessary
than ever for new law graduates. If clients of law firms have become more
savvy and are no longer willing to subsidize the apprenticeships of new
lawyers, then law schools will have to do their best to make their students
more practice ready. Of course, as I mentioned earlier, it remains unclear
whether we can agree about what it means for a graduate to be practice
ready.

While

we are unlikely to reach real consensus on that question, it is

incumbent upon law schools, in my opinion, to reach out into the legal
communities that will be absorbing our graduates and find out precisely what
skills and knowledge legal employers want from new lawyers. That said, we
must acknowledge that skills training and particularly clinical training is very
expensive,31) and state law schools in particular are dramatically underfunded.
Third, we should continue deemphasizing Socratic teaching, high-stakes
examinations, and similar summative assessment methods for our students.
Although many of us believe there is significant value in having students
engage in public oral exchange with a professor about the nuances of legal
doctrine, the practice is widely known to inspire anxiety in students. It should
not remain the default method of educating our students across all doctrinal
courses. Likewise, grading that depends on a single examination after

a

semester of study needlessly makes students miserable. Moreover, by relying
30) See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ.
Liberties L. Rev. 595, 59596 (2008).
31) Katherine Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and Misconceptions
About Theory and Practice, 45 McGeorge L. Rev. 8, 36 (2014). Among the less
expensive proposals she advocates in this vein are offering online modules and short
courses for legal topics that are taught on the bar, as well as jettisoning the use of
casebooks for upper level classes. Id.
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on summative assessments we lose the opportunity to learn, while we are
teaching, what our students do and do not understand about our lessons. In a
related vein, we should consider introducing courses into the curriculum that
promote self-reflection and mindfulness in our students, as one of my colleagues,
Professor Laurel Rigertas, has recently done.32)
Fourth, we should prepare our students to be problem solvers and to go out
into the world to seek to enhance social justice. Professor Carrie MenkelMeadow has, to my mind, made a strong argument that the talk we hear in
the United States that too many lawyers being produced by law schools is
overblown. It is not that there are too many lawyers, or too many law school
seats, or even that there are not enough jobs, she explains, it is that those
who are trained by studying law could study different things and practice or
work with more appropriate knowledge bases and skills sets.33)Her suggestion
is that we figure out ways to train our students to build institutions to help
solve social problems. Among the training that would be necessary to include
in the legal curriculum are problem-solving strategies, economics, organizational
development, psychology, decision-making, human resource management.34)
Fifth, we should teach more of our students about the business of law and
how to manage a legal practice. Although graduates from elite schools are
unlikely to hang out a shingle as a solo practitioner or to join a small firm, it
is not at all uncommon for graduates from regional state schools to begin
practicing on their own or in a small firm immediately upon graduation. How
one goes about opening banks accounts, maintaining escrow accounts, reading
a balance sheet, and purchasing malpractice insurance, among a hundred other
things, are mysteries to many of our graduates. But we must also assure that
our graduates are tech savvy and understand how to practice law in an
environment that is highly networked and specialized, and where competitors

32) See also Carasik, supra note 14, at 780.
33) Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 134.
34) Id. at 146; see also Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal
Education, 62 Catholic U. L. Rev. 643, 672 (2013) (advocating for the adoption of a
problem-solving curriculum).
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are increasingly offering unbundled legal services to potential clients.35)
Sixth, we should continue to teach students to think like a lawyer and to
cultivate liberal habits of mind. Personally, I believe it is important to embrace
the idea of law school as a provider of an advanced liberal education for our
students.

We

do not train our students to be problem solvers just by asking

them to practice skills like brief writing or interviewing techniques, or by
literally solving problem sets in class.

We

really teach them to be problem

solvers by broadening their horizons and introducing them to new ideas from
economics and sociology, or even from literature. One scholar has suggested
every lawyer should be taught to read a balance sheet, should be able to
converse in a language other than English, and should memorize at least one
poem by heart.36)

While

the list is designedly quirky, I am sympathetic to her

motivations.

Ⅵ. Conclusion
I want to conclude by again thanking you for inviting me to speak with
you. I also want to emphasize some bottom line points for me. First, I agree
with past greats like Karl Llewellyn that it is the duty of law schools to
provide our students with a practical education that prepares them to enter the
profession and succeed. But like Llewellyn, I believe that cultivating the mind
in the tradition of a liberal-arts graduate school is part of the necessary
practical training we owe our students. Finding the right balance is our chief
challenge. I also want to emphasize that I do not agree with the call, heard
recently in the United States, to reduce the number of law schools and law
school graduates, due to a glut of lawyers in the legal employment market.
This same type of rhetoric appeared during the Great Depression, and was
motivated at least implicitly by fears that Jews and other recent immigrants
were gaining too strong a foothold in the legal market.37)
35) See Garon, supra note 21, at 1182.
36) Matsuda, supra note 12, at 1397.
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No one could reasonably claim that we have too many lawyers in the United
States. Far from it. Every day criminal defendants are coerced into accepting
plea deals from prosecutors because their public-defender lawyer is burdened
with a caseload exponentially too large for her to manage responsibly. Tenants
are evicted because they lack the resources to hire a lawyer to help them.
Victims

of domestic abuse are left unprotected because they are unable to

figure out how to get protective orders enforced. In a word, the need for
lawyers to serve underprivileged American has never been more profound, but
the poor cannot afford lawyers.38)But unless state governments undertake the
obligation to pay for lawyers for the impoverished, it is unrealistic to expect
lawyers to be able to help.
But that is a topic for another time.
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